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Companies spend millions of dollars on ﬁrewalls, encryption and secure access devices,
and it's money wasted, because none of these measures address the weakest link in the
security chain.
Kevin Mitnick
Investigating mis-implementation of SSL Libraries in Android
Applications
Halil Avc
Abstract
This thesis presents our analysis of applications that are popular at the market against
SSL miss-implementation. 8.882 applications analyzed and as a result 2.354 applications
have at least one miss use of SSL libraries which are Custom TrustManager, Custom
HostnameVeriﬁers and WebViewClient libraries. After analysis phase we have created a
proof of concept application as an Xposed framework plugin to identify vulnerabilities.
Our conclusion is that 27 percent of applications have a vulnerability from SSL connection
stand point. The main reasons for these vulnerabilities are developer errors and third
party generators or libraries. Using third party libraries can cause security bugs which
leads to informations leakage or exploitation.
Keywords: Android, SSL, Vulnerability, Custom TrustManager, Custom HostnameV-
eriﬁers, WebViewClient
Android Uygulamalarnda SSL Zaﬁyetlerinin Ara³trlmas
Halil Avc
Öz
Çal³mamz, Android markette yer alan popüler uygulamalarn SSL zaﬁyetlerinin ara³trl-
mas ve bunlarn sunulmasn içermektedir. 8.882 uygulama analiz edilmi³ ve sonuç olarak
2.354 uygulamann en az bir SSL kütüphanesini yanl³ kulland§n ortaya koyduk. Analiz
a³amasn takiben uygulama üzerinde zaﬁyetleri ortaya çkarmak için Xposed altyapsn
kullanarak örnek bir uygulama gerçekle³tirdik. SSL uygulama zaﬁyeti açsndan in-
celedi§imiz uygulamalarn yüzde 27'sinin sorun içerdi§i sonucuna vardk. Bu zaﬁyetlerin
ana sebepleri geli³tirici hatalar, üçüncü parti kütüphane ve uygulamalarn kullanlmas
olarak tespit ettik. Sorunlu üçüncü parti kütüphanelerin kullanlmas mahremiyet ihlali
ve zaﬁyetlerin istismar edilmesi gibi hatalara yol açt§n ortaya koyduk.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Android, SSL, Zaﬁyet
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the rise of smart phones people tend to use applications to ease their daily routine
of their life's like reading news, gathering their emails, messaging through their social
accounts, taking photos and sending them to their backup cloud, paying bills, transaction
money using their bank apps and the list goes on. When we consider this small list many
personal data can eavesdropped by a second person if connection is not secure, or the
implementation of the secure channel is miss-implemented.
People have gain the awareness of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connection information
when they browse the internet via browsers. Maybe they don't know the underlying tech-
nology but they aware of a green lock icon indicating that the site they are connecting is
using SSL and they can "securely" connect and perform their operations. But in applica-
tions all the connection stuﬀ is done by applications or operating system services out of
sight of the user. Everything done under the hood. An average user couldn't understand
if there is a connection and if there is any, couldn't understand that connection is secure
or unsecure. They thrust the application provider; but sometimes application developers
lack of understanding about security concepts. They generally tend to implement the
business logic in an easy and time eﬃcient manner.
Android has extension points for SSL certiﬁcate validation. This extension points can be
used to harden the security of the application like certiﬁcate pinning or can be used to
bypass security exceptions which is caused by forged certiﬁcates, expired certiﬁcates, the
ones created by adversaries etc. Also a common issue, codes which is deployed to ease
development process can be forgotten by developers at the production application. This
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codes generally used to test with internal development server with bypassed certiﬁcate
checks.
In this thesis, 8882 applications at the market analyzed for their SSL implementations.
A risk table created according to diﬀerent factors and a proof of concept application
created to identify SSL miss-use at the operation system level. We are investigating
secure communication. While expressing SSL we also use the word as a synonym of
TLS.
There are some researches like "Why eve and mallory love android: An analysis of android
ssl (in) security"[1] and "Smv-hunter: Large scale, automated detection of ssl/tls man-
in-the-middle vulnerabilities in android apps"[2] on the subject; we plan to focus on
applications from a Turkish market user and target to extent researches one step further.
Our work is focused on SSL implementation errors which are caused by application
developers. SSL protocol implementation errors like heartbleed [3] bug or vulnerabilities
recently disclosed on OpenSSL [4] are diﬀerent and these are out of scope of our work.
Most of the vulnerable code just ignores SSL checks and returns always true. An example
code from a ﬁnancial application is follows:
class MySSLSocketFactory$1 implements javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager {
final synthetic com.z.zmobil.serviceclient.MySSLSocketFactory this$0;
public void checkClientTrusted(X509Certificate[] p1, String p2)
{
return;
}
public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] p1, String p2)
{
return;
}
public X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers()
{
return 0;
}
}
Chapter 2
SSL & SSL Applications in Android
For encrypted communications The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is the de facto communi-
cation protocol between two points generally a server and a client. If the implementation
is incorrect it is possible that an attacker can intercept the communication and place a
man in the middle attack. SSL is based on Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). Which
means there is a public key and a private key that are paired. A server holds both public
and private keys and publishes public key. Whenever a client wants to communicate
through secure channel, uses this public key and initiates a handshake procedure with
the server. Server proves it has the private key by signing its certiﬁcate with public-key
cryptography. And a secure channel is established between two.
At this point it crucial to know that certiﬁcate is genuine and the certiﬁcate holder is
the exact person that he told so. Because a valid forged certiﬁcate can be published
and without validation a secure channel is established not with the server but with
the attacker. To solve this issue server and clients host root certiﬁcates of Certiﬁcate
Authorities (CAs) which are well known. Certiﬁcate Authorities work as a notary for
certiﬁcates to approve that certiﬁcate is belong to the one that client is trying connect
to or disapproves that certiﬁcate is not belong to the claimer. This is the ﬁrst extension
point of Android: Custom TrustManager. Custom TrustManager is the extension point
where a developer can change the validation logic of certiﬁcate and CAs. Developer
can introduce a new CA, can ignore well known CAs, deploys and validates self-signed
certiﬁcates. This can be used for hardening like certiﬁcate pinning or disabling security
like always success resulted certiﬁcate checks.
3
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Certiﬁcate might be from a trusted source but it might still issue for someone else you are
trying to connect to. So while certiﬁcate is being checked for validation, subject or subject
alternative name ﬁelds compared to match the server you are trying to reach. This is
the second extension point of Android: Custom HostnameVeriﬁers. This extension point
gives ﬂexibility to developer to check hostname with its own algorithm. With virtual
hosting, when sharing a server for more than one hostname with HTTPS, this can be
handy.
Third extension point is WebViewClient. Which is used to extent the secure communi-
cation that occurred in a browser component used in the application.
Those are the extension points for speciﬁc needs. Without extending secure connection
in Android is as easy as:
URL url = new URL("https://wikipedia.org");
URLConnection urlConnection = url.openConnection();
InputStream in = urlConnection.getInputStream();
copyInputStreamToOutputStream(in, System.out);
Chapter 3
Application Testing Methodology
For our thesis we basically follow static and dynamic testing methodologies. If we break
down into phases:
1. Downloading applications from App Store
2. Performing static tests for each application
3. Analyzing results
4. Performing dynamic tests for a few selected applications
5. Creating a proof of concept application to identify SSL miss-implementations in
the applications.
3.1 Challenges
Downloading applications from App Store is the ﬁrst step of testing and probably is
the diﬃcult one. After some research for gathering applications without using phone
by downloading one by one we stumble upon a project at github called google-play-
crawler[5] which is developed by Ali Demiröz. Google Play Crawler Java Api searches
android applications on Google Play, and downloads them. To start crawling Google
Play Crawler needs a list of applications or list of categories on the application mar-
ket. We got the application categories from Google Play and fed Google Play Crawler
with those information. When crawler started to download applications, Google Play
5
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banned the crawler from downloading because it detected as an attack to the system for
too many requests in a short period of time. Adjustments made by try and error like
delaying requests and Crawler started again to download applications. As a result 8882
applications downloaded which allocates almost 16 Gigabytes of space.
Static analysis took roughly 13.500 minutes to run. The total amount of time spent
to ﬁnish static analysis took more because we need to include setup time, installing
applications, conﬁguring, writing required scripts to parse output, copying ﬁles and etc.
We try to test nogotofail[6] setup from google for dynamic testing but we couldn't manage
to connect OpenVPN[7] server from the device which is necessary to investigate the
traﬃc. OpenVPN needs tun.ko kernel module which is not available on Android X86
port. We performed our dynamic analysis with the CERT Tapioca[8] virtual machine.
3.2 Static Analysis
After gathering applications from App Store we setup a system for Static Analysis. This
setup uses Androguard and mallodroid[9].
Androguard[10] is a tool written in python to analyze, inspect and change Application
packages (APK) .apk ﬁles, Android's binary xml, Android Resources and the most im-
portant one disassemble de-compilation of .dex (Dalvik virtual machine) ﬁles which is
compiled code of the application.
Mallodroid is an Androguard extension, runs on top of Androguard and it ﬁnds broken
SSL certiﬁcate validation in Android Apps. Mallodroid is developed by Sascha Fahl et
al to perform SSL miss-implementation inspect in applications. Details of the work is
explained at the Related Work at the following sections. We need to slightly change mal-
lodroid code to handle WebViewClient extension and we deploy some exception handling.
Also some performance enhancements was made.
Analyzing an application takes 2 to 5 minutes according to application size because there
are many steps:
• Unpacking APK ﬁle
• Decompiling ﬁles
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• Converting from DEX to java language
• Constructing function call hierarchy
• Test java code to ﬁnd out if there is an extension for the methods that are related
to SSL communication
• And ﬁnally test if they correctly implement SSL extension.
3.3 Inspection of results
Each static result of an application is written to a ﬁle. After static analysis those ﬁles
collected and parsed through a program which is written in Microsoft C#. Parsed
data than inserted to database to beneﬁt from SQL capabilities to create reports of the
result. Implementation types categorized, applications that uses pinned certiﬁcations
identiﬁed, used Libraries classiﬁed, Custom TrustManagers identiﬁed and so on. 201
pinning implementations found out of 4590 applications that extent libraries.
From the Implementation stand point 69 percent of the implemented libraries are having
problem with Custom TrustManager.
Table 3.1: Number of Vulnerable Implementations by Implemention Type
Implemention Type Number of Vulnerable Implementations
WebViewClient 9
Custom TrustManager 2.964
Custom HostnameVeriﬁers 1.343
Some of the Custom TrustManager package names are self-explanatory like TrustAllMan-
ager, TrustingX509TrustManager or SSLSocketFactoryTrustAll which are vulnerable to
MITM because they are not validating SSL certiﬁcates. And PinningTrustManager is not
vulnerable and its name states that it's validating certiﬁcate against a pining certiﬁcate.
Game categories have a huge Number of Vulnerable Applications compared to other
Categories.
73 percent of Library Implementations are generated by third party components used
by application developers. 40 percent of these implementations are ads and analytics
cumulatively. This is a good point because generally these libraries doesn't collect high
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Table 3.2: Custom TrustManager Examples
Custom TrustManager Is Vulnerable Number Of Apps
MySSLSocketFactory TRUE 588
DefaultTrustManager TRUE 247
NaiveTrustManager TRUE 214
HttpRequest TRUE 125
PinningTrustManager FALSE 116
SSLSocketFactoryEx TRUE 77
TrustManagerDecorator FALSE 67
SslUtils TRUE 63
TrustingX509TrustManager TRUE 56
SSLSocketFactoryTrustAll TRUE 54
TrustManagerDelegate FALSE 53
FileTransfer TRUE 68
TrustEveryoneTrustManager TRUE 48
SPSSLSocketFactory FALSE 42
EasyX509TrustManager FALSE 34
EasySSLSocketFactory TRUE 33
IgnoreCertTrustManager TRUE 28
SandboxSSLSocketFactory TRUE 26
FTPSTrustManager FALSE 20
HttpUtil TRUE 20
TrivialTrustManager TRUE 17
TrustAllManager TRUE 15
NonValidatingTrustManager TRUE 14
sensitive data but one must aware that these libraries generally collect Meta data like
person's usage habits.
A risk factor is calculated for each risky application. This risk factor is calculated with
diﬀerent indications like permission requests, number of downloads and category of the
application. Permission requests graded for their impacts to the use like application with
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission top graded from the risk stand point while
FLASHLIGHT permission low graded. Number of downloads is graded according to the
number of user impacted from the risk like "5+" downloads impacts maximum 10 people
and has low severity but "1,000,000,000+" downloads impacts maximum "2000,000,000"
users and has top graded risk score. Category of the application is diﬀerentiate the factor
from the risk point like the application is important if it's in the ﬁnance category but far
less important if it's in one of the game categories. All points calculated and applications
graded for their risk points and they are normalized with the equation 3.1 into ten risk
groups. And Impact Score is calculated as in equation 3.2
mean = 1 + (ImpactScore− min
ImpactScore
)) ∗ (10− 1)/( max
ImpactScore
− min
ImpactScore
) (3.1)
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Table 3.3: Number Of Vulnerable (Miss-implemented SSL) Applications by Category
Category Number Of Apps Cumulative Risk Percentage of Aﬀected Persons
Game Total 1.173 68.771 %42,03
Travel And Local 67 5495 %0,80
Social 66 5839 %1,74
Business 66 6633 %1,03
Personalization 64 5950 %0,03
Entertainment 63 4135 %6,92
Communication 61 8676 %21,85
Shopping 56 3780 %0,14
Transportation 56 4176 %0,45
Sports 55 3877 %0,38
Medical 55 3272 %0,10
App Wallpaper 53 4382 %12,16
News And Magazines 51 2888 %1,47
Finance 51 4222 %0,21
Productivity 50 4386 %0,72
Education 49 2508 %0,19
Media And Video 48 2896 %0,60
Weather 44 3446 %1,05
Music And Audio 41 2901 %4,42
Lifestyle 40 3042 %0,78
Tools 37 3398 %1,21
Health And Fitness 35 2636 %0,91
Comics 33 1888 %0,07
Books And Reference 17 789 %0,69
Photography 14 923 %0,06
Libraries And Demo 5 236 %0,00
App Widgets 4 368 %0,00
Total 2.354 161.513 %100,00
ImpactScore =
∑
RiskAccordingtoPermissionRequests
+RiskAccordingtoNumberofDownloads
+RiskAccordingtoCategoryofTheApplication
(3.2)
From the result we see that launcher applications request many important permissions
and when we add up category information and download number they have the ﬁrst two
order within the highest ranked risk group. Then comes the messenger applications.
3.4 Dynamic Analysis
We used Android-x86 Project for our application test. Although testing in real devices
is the desired solution but it's not practical. And creating an isolated environment is
better to prevent interventions. We created a virtual machine as our Android device and
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Figure 3.1: Number of Applications by Normalized Risk Groups
make conﬁgurations like network setup etc. Then took a snapshot for our base to revert
after each test. We use adb to push our applications. And our virtual devices connection
ﬂow through our proxy environment to test for SSL vulnerabilities[11].
3.4.1 CERT Transparent Proxy Capture Appliance (Tapioca)
A similar test as in our scenario was held in CERT Coordination Center (CERT-CC)
at Carnegie Mellon University. They evaluated some application tools used as MITM
proxies but they decided to go with a transparent network layer. With a transparent
network layer proxy an application is not aware that it is being proxied. So they created
a preconﬁgured VM appliance to perform MITM analysis called CERT Tapioca[8].
The setup is simple; a VM that has two network adapters: one for the outer side and
one for the local side. On the local side, it provides NAT, DHCP, and DNS capabilities.
For the MITM proxy, mitmproxy software is being used. To conﬁgure things up startup
scripts prepared and it's ready to use listening and manipulating traﬃc at port 443.
3.4.2 Nogotofail
Nogotofail is more complete tool to spot and ﬁx weak TLS/SSL connections and sensitive
clear text traﬃc which is maintained by Google. It includes testing for common SSL
certiﬁcate veriﬁcation issues, HTTPS and TLS/SSL library bugs, SSL and STARTTLS
stripping issues, clear text issues, and more. It's a Linux based tool that depends on
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Python and pyOpenSSL. It has also client tools to enrich log reports that includes extra
client information application information etc. Traﬃc analyzer can be deployed as a
router, VPN server, or proxy. There are three kind of installations ﬁrst can run on an
actual router, second a Linux box with two network interfaces. And the last one as
a VPN server. Google also provide last one almost preconﬁgured as Google Compute
Engine instance[6].
We tried to deploy nogotofail on a virtual machine and try to connect from real de-
vice and we couldn't succeeded. And OpenVPN client application couldn't be deployed
to Android-x86 device. We decided to try Google Compute Engine instance and we
succeeded. We preferred CERT Tapioca because it's simple and local.
3.5 Cross Reference Traversing
We can ﬁnd out extension of SSL libraries by decompiling the APK ﬁles. Then we can
investigate the class if it is vulnerable or not. But testing the application from the device
against the vulnerability is not simple. We need the exact user interface where the classes
executed. To ease the testing procedure we created a python script called XrefTree A
on top of androguard to expose Cross References and traverse each path form the SSL
extension class to UI interfaces. With this our test is much easier because we know how
to trigger the communication.
3.6 Analysis and Results
We choose 41 applications for dynamic analysis from top 400 applications ordered by
descending by their risk factor. The applications picked are mainly targets Turkish
users and some are speciﬁcally chosen for analysis like known to be not exploitable
but implemented pinning certiﬁcation. Applications tested with Android X86 port on
a virtual machine which's connection transparently go through from a second virtual
machine that has Cert Tapioca installed. Applications tested one by one with most
feasible, user like behavior. After the process we analyze traﬃc pcaps with wireshark
providing with SSL private keys which are used for test purposes to decode SSL traﬃc.
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The results diﬀerentiated from static analysis. Because all usage paths couldn't be
covered, applications require some special info like account info, user, password entry
etc. And some of them couldn't be tested that they require some components that we
couldn't provide like location info or our device known to be a tablet and application
doesn't provide and quits. Some of the applications has SSL connection libraries but
while dynamic test they only connect through HTTP.
Table 3.4: Dynamic Analysis Break Down
Analysis Result Number of Applications
SSL Vulnerable to MITM 4
HTTP Connection Only 6
Can not Establish Connection 27
Not Applicable 4
As a result four of the applications; that's a proportion of 9.76 percent in our test
observed that they are vulnerable to mitm attacks. The percent is not high as static
analysis. But two out of four vulnerable applications are belong to ﬁnancial institutions
(banks) and all of the banking transactions can be sniﬀed by an attacker.
Chapter 4
Proposed Solution
We developed a proof of concept application as an Xposed module to identify SSL miss-
implementations in the applications.
4.1 Xposed
Xposed is an application that's bind itself to the base process of Android and provide
application/method call hook points to its modules to perform various operations like
UI tweaks, new features, feature enhancements etc.
Android runtime has a base process called "Zygote". Every application is started as
a copy ("fork") of it. When the phone is booted /init.rc script started Zygote. The
process start is done with /system/bin/app_process, which loads the needed classes and
invokes the initialization methods. When a user install Xposed, an extended app_process
executable is copied to /system/bin. When the system boots it's now a part of Zygote.
Some initializations are done there and also the modules are loaded. Zygote gets called
in the very beginning of the process.
When modiﬁcations done by decompiling, reverse engineering an APK; one has to dive
into the code ﬁnd the exact place to modify. After ﬁndings there are other steps patch,
recompile, sign and pack for the apk. Also the application must be distributed. And
when you decompile generally that means that you don't own the application and you
can't sign the apk on behalf of the owner. And this patch operation is valid just for that
13
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version, when there is an update, all the work needs to be done from scratch. Xposed
has another way of doing patches: By hooking to methods of the target applications
which are the smallest unit in Java. With Xposed you can inject your own code before
and after methods.
Xposed has a plugin system that are loaded with system reboot which are special appli-
cations consist of target application hook method signatures and the code that wanted
to be injected before or after the method call. When target application started, desired
methods found and hooked with reﬂection and when the function call placed; code exe-
cuted which can access all the method's parameters and it can change the values of the
caller[12].
4.2 Trust But Verify
We developed an Xposed module named "Trust But Verify" for our proof of concept
application. There are three diﬀerent extension points for diﬀerent parts of the SSL
connection. And we hook up certain methods for each of the implementation type. After
the hook we forged a certiﬁcate and test method against the certiﬁcate. If the method
validates the certiﬁcate it fails. This means the application can be attacked by a man
in the middle. If the method fails to validate then it is secure for improper certiﬁcates.
The application is now just generating notiﬁcation logs. But it can be enhanced to block
for improper buggy implementations of SSL extensions.
For Custom HostnameVeriﬁers we hook up javax.net.ssl. HttpsURLConnection method.
For WebViewClient implementation type we hook up android.webkit.WebViewClient
method. And for Custom TrustManager com.android.org.conscrypt. TrustManagerImpl,
checkServerTrusted and javax.net.ssl. TrustManagerFactory methods hooked up.
Chapter 5
Development Best Practices for
Security & Privacy
5.1 Certiﬁcate Pinning
SSL's strength is also weakness of it: Negotiating on a key for symmetric encryption
is done by asymmetric cryptography. The public key that is used for encryption is pre
shared with clients via operating systems or the software programs that is used like
browsers. These pre-shared pre-deﬁned keys are called trust anchors are generated by
and belong to trusted third parties called certiﬁcate authorities (CA).
As a result of EFF's SSL Observatory[13] project which aims to investigate the publicly-
visible SSL certiﬁcates there were 650 Certiﬁcate Authorities on August 2010. And there
are 162 root certiﬁcates CA's already installed as trusted authority on a stock rom in-
stalled Android operating system. This number can increase with carrier like AT&T,
Verizon or device manufacturer like Samsung, HTC etc. customized installations[14].
Certiﬁcate authorities sign intermediate certiﬁcates that have ability to sign end user
certiﬁcates (End Entity) this certiﬁcate generation and signing process is general pur-
pose so any issuer can generate and sign certiﬁcates for any domain. When one of the
certiﬁcate of CA or intermediate certiﬁcates compromised, hacker can issue a genuine
certiﬁcate whichever domain he wants. And there are 162 certiﬁcate authorities for an-
droid and more than 650 certiﬁcate authorities for internet. Certiﬁcate compromisation
15
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happens rarely but with big negative impacts on security as seen on DigiNotar, Comodo
and TurkTrust cases.
DigiNotar was a Dutch certiﬁcate authority owned by VASCO Data Security Interna-
tional, whose security breached and incident declared on September 3, 2011. Fake Dig-
iNotar certiﬁcates were found and hackers created fake Gmail domain certiﬁcates and
used for man-in-the-middle attacks[15].
One of Comodo reseller user account compromised and created 9 certiﬁcates, across 7 dif-
ferent domains including www.google.com, login.yahoo.com, login.skype.com certiﬁcates
were revoked after discovery[16].
On December 24, 2012 Google discovered fake certiﬁcates issued for "*.google.com" via
its browser Chrome's certiﬁcate pinning for Google domains. TurkTrust certiﬁcation au-
thority (CA) has been reported that two intermediate CA certiﬁcates inadvertently issued
in August 2011. The certiﬁcates were issued in error and they were for "*.ego.gov.tr"
and "e-islem.kktcmerkezbankasi.org." "*.google.com" certiﬁcate issued automatically by
Check Point ﬁrewall which was conﬁgured for inspection generates certiﬁcates for all SSL
connections. Google Chrome and other browsers blacklisted the inadvertent intermediate
CA certiﬁcates and published metadata update to block the mistaken CA certiﬁcates[17].
To mitigate the attack surface certiﬁcate pinning might be a solution for defense in
depth like layering tactic. Unlike browsers or the tools that doesn't know about the
connection destination of the client; application generally connects same and already
known server's addresses. So some of the certiﬁcate information can be added to double
check against the certiﬁcate that is going to be used while communicating. It's prevent
man-in-the-middle attack with generated certiﬁcate for that domain using compromised
issuer certiﬁcate except the one that's used for genuine certiﬁcate issuer. For the time
being with current number of trust anchors in Android it's provide protection at a rate
of %99.38
For certiﬁcate pinning hex-encoded hash of a X.509 certiﬁcate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo
used. Using certiﬁcate hashes mislead wrong directions. Because there are multiple cer-
tiﬁcates with the same public key, subject name. But certiﬁcates might have diﬀerent
extensions, diﬀerent expiry dates and there might be diﬀerent certiﬁcates signed with dif-
ferent cryptographic hash function like one with SHA-1 and other with SHA256. Devices
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might build certiﬁcates chains with an alternative version of a certiﬁcate than the one
that expected. Certiﬁcate validation is started from End Entity which is leaf certiﬁcate
contains a signature which must be a valid signature from its parent. So that the public
key of the parent is ﬁxed by the leaf certiﬁcate. Which's public key info hash is safe to
use for pinning[18] [19]. A set of pins can be deﬁned for certiﬁcate alternatives as well.
There's a working Android library[20] for certiﬁcate pinning by Moxie Marlinspike and
example project by Ivan KuÅ½t[21]. Required pin hash can be generated using the
provided script from Marlinspike's library providing certiﬁcate ﬁle.
Pin generation:
$ git clone https://github.com/moxie0/AndroidPinning.git
$ cd AndroidPinning
$ python ./pin.py /path/to/cacert.pem
Figure 5.1: Using PinningTrustManager for certiﬁcate validation with pin information
There is also more rigid way for pinning: That's left behind all trust anchors, CA's
left behind and use freshly forged for the application. On the server side a new strong
certiﬁcate can be created to sign certiﬁcates for application. This can be done via a
hardware security module (HSM) which is a physical computing device that safeguards
and manages digital keys for strong authentication and provides crypto processing or with
using OpenSSL. It's a best practice to keep private keys oine for security purposes.
Certiﬁcates that are going to be used by application for secure communication than
distributed with applications package in a keystore ﬁle which can easily be created using
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keytool. And deﬁnitely application had to provide this keystore to TrustManagerFactory
in order to use created certiﬁcate. This is a hardcoded way and downside of this method
is it is diﬃcult to manage certiﬁcate updates. But its provide immunity for all trust
anchors compromisation risk[22].
Create a keystore using keytool:
$ wget http://bouncycastle.org/download/bcprov-jdk16-146.jar
$ keytool -importcert -file your_signing_certificate.pem
-keystore yourapp.store
-provider org.bouncycastle.jce. provider.BouncyCastleProvider
-providerpath bcprov-jdk16-146.jar -storetype BKS
Figure 5.2: Standard HTTPS request with pre-forged self-certiﬁcate.
You also need to be aware that it's possible to bypass SSL Pinning (pdf). However, this
requires the app to be reverse engineered, re-constructed and re-run that's very unlikely
to ever be possible 'on the ﬂy' (at least on unlocked devices) as a random user gets hit
by a MITM attack[23].
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5.2 Certiﬁcate pinning in Android
With the release of Android 4.2 Jelly Bean[24] Certiﬁcate Pinning introduced as a new
feature "Certiﬁcate Pinning - The libcore SSL implementation now supports certiﬁcate
pinning. Pinned domains will receive a certiﬁcate validation failure if the certiﬁcate does
not chain to a set of expected certiﬁcates. This protects against possible compromise of
Certiﬁcate Authorities"
Pin information is stored in a ﬁle called "pins" can be located in the /data/misc/keychain
directory which has a format of:
hostname=enforcing[true|false]|SPKI SHA512 hash, SPKI SHA512 hash,...
Format can be translated as there are list of SPKI hashes (SHA512) separated by com-
mas with enforcing either true or false for a domain. There is no pre-conﬁgured built-in
pins. Pin informations are valid until it is removed from the ﬁle. Pin check is in-
tegrated in libcore. If X509TrustManager implementation (TrustManagerImpl) used
for validating certiﬁcate chains, pin information used for validating otherwise the stan-
dard checkServerTrusted() method doesn't consult the pin list. This is because to pro-
vide backwards compatibility from the user perspective using latest doesn't necessar-
ily mean that your connection always validated against system-level certiﬁcate pins.
Third party applications can beneﬁt system-level certiﬁcate pin information via the new
X509TrustManagerExtensions[25] SDK class which has a single method: that returns a
validated chain on success or throws CertiﬁcateException if validation fails.
Figure 5.3: Veriﬁes the given certiﬁcate chain.
The chain parameter holds the peer certiﬁcate chain and authType parameter is for the
key exchange algorithm used. The ﬁnal parameter, host, should be the hostname of the
server.
Returns
The properly ordered chain used for veriﬁcation as a list of X509Certiﬁcates.
Throws CertificateException
if the chain does not verify correctly.
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Client handshake (ClientHandshakeImpl) and SSL socket (OpenSSLSocketImpl) imple-
mentations at the default SSL engine (JSSE provider) use pin information to validate
for that host. If there is an entry for that host and couldn't validate certiﬁcate chain,
validation fails with CertificateException and connection won't be established.
For the time being pins ﬁle doesn't exist in the stock roms, which means that there is
no certiﬁcate pin information. Functionality implemented but it doesn't used eﬃcient
enough. The pins ﬁle is not written directly by the OS instead the pin list is updated
by sending a broadcast with signed update data which is triggered by a broadcast (an-
droid.intent.action.UPDATE_PINS) that contains the new pins. As mentioned it is
signed with SHA512 with RSA signature. The receiver of the broadcast (CertPinInstall-
Receiver) will then verify the signature and update pin information. Public key used for
validation is stored as a system secure setting under the "conﬁg_update_certiﬁcate" key
(usually in the secure table of the /data/data/com.android.providers.settings/databases
/settings.db)[26]
5.3 Alternative Methods for Certiﬁcate Validation
Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP (PKPE) by Google and Trust Assertions for
Certiﬁcate Keys (TACK) by Moxie Marlinspike are two standards that have been pro-
posed for Certiﬁcate Validation. And there is also a method called "Certiﬁcate Memo-
rizing".
Google, proposes a new HTTP header (Public-Key-Pin, PKP) with PKPE that holds
pinning information including public key hashes, pin lifetime and whether to apply pin-
ning to subdomains of the current host. Header information is delivered to via TLS
encrypted connection. And keys are validated against pre cached pins or accepted as
valid for the ﬁrst arrival to the expiration time. It also provides a mechanism for report-
ing fraudulent certiﬁcates used for MITM attacks via "report-uri" directive[27].
TACK, proposes an extension to SSL/TLS that carries pinning information signed with
a dedicated 'TACK key' for hostname with an expiration time independent from its
certiﬁcate. Short-lived tacks may be used to limit the eﬀect of compromised TLS private
key. It's an extension to SSL/TLS so it's backwards compatible. Tack[28] pins cached
after a few visits.
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Figure 5.4: HTTP Response Header Field Examples
Certiﬁcate Memorizing method hands over the acceptance of the unknown certiﬁcate
or diﬀerent certiﬁcate previously seen before for a site visited to the user. There is a
proof of concept Android project called MemorizingTrustManager[29] which asks the
user whether to accept the certiﬁcate once, permanently or to abort the connection. The
problem is that technically unsophisticated users might get confused and application
usage can decrease drastically.
According to an academic paper[30] published by Adam Bates et al. from University
of Florida SSL certiﬁcate veriﬁcation can be done via dynamic linking for C/C++ SSL
implementations. When an SSL library entry function is called their implementation
took over SSL veriﬁcation to enforce the correct SSL certiﬁcation veriﬁcation proce-
dure. Without needing to change application code it can sit on top of implementations.
Dynamic linking can be implemented as byte code instrumentation for JVM based ap-
plications. For Android applications it can be implemented as a core module or as byte
code instrumentation between system and user modules.
Perspectives Project[31] at Carnegie Mellon University and Convergence project by
Moxie Marlinspike, aim to eliminate pre authenticated Certiﬁcate Authorities (CA).
Instead they propose agile, secure, and distributed notary based certiﬁcate validation.
By eliminating CAs users are immune to CA compromises. A user can choose to trust
several notaries; no single point of failure. And several notaries can vouch for a single
site. Convergence implemented as a Firefox browser add-on and a server-side notary
daemon.
Chapter 6
Related Work
On October 18, 2012, Sascha Fahl et al. from Leibniz University of Hannover and
Philipps University of Marburg published a paper titled as "Why Eve and Mallory Love
Android: An Analysis of Android SSL (In)Security"[1]. They downloaded 13.500 popular
free apps for the research from Google's Play Market and studied their properties with
respect to the usage of SSL. The results showed that 1.074 apps potentially vulnerable
to SSL MITM Vulnerability and they picked randomly 100 potentially vulnerable apps
for manual dynamic analysis yielding 41 vulnerable apps to MITM attack. For static
code analysis they have built MalloDroid, a tool to detect apps that potentially use
SSL/TLS inadequately or implement incorrectly and thus are potentially vulnerable to
MITM attacks. They also presented an online survey to explore whether or not the user
can assess the security of a connection in the Android browser. Our work is an update
for their reports with current applications for a Turkish market user and also completes
their work with an application to identify ﬂaws at run time.
Sounthiraraj, Sahs, Greenwood, Lin and Khan from The University of Texas at Dallas
published a paper[2] about an application which combines static and dynamic analysis
techniques to perform automated, large-scale SSL MITM Vulnerabilities detection for
Android applications called SMV-HUNTER. Their application step forward from others
with the ability of identifying UI targets to trigger vulnerabilities found from static anal-
ysis phase. Output of the static analysis also prepares some relevant input variables for
performing automatic UI exploration while attempting MITM attacks. SMV-HUNTER
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application itself didn't published to public. Our work has reports with statuses of cur-
rent applications for a Turkish market user and also we published an application which
identiﬁes ﬂaws at run time. Our work can be enhanced with automated tests as in this
work.
Will Dormann, who is a member of CERT(computer emergency response team) at
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) published a blog post titled as "Finding Android SSL
Vulnerabilities with CERT Tapioca"[32] about automated discovery of SSL vulnerabili-
ties in Android applications. At CERT they've created a Linux distribution for MITM
analysis called CERT Tapioca[33]. With the use of CERT Tapioca and some scripts they
managed to automate tests and they notiﬁed application developers with vulnerability
details. Some of the applications and application generation frameworks like AppsGeyser
got ﬁxed with in the following timeframe. They also published and maintained a list of
vulnerable applications as an Android application SSL spreadsheet[34] at Google docs.
Dormann also inserted vulnerable applications to CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures) database. CVE is the de facto standard for tracking vulnerabilities in ap-
plications. Up to this date 1.000.462 applications tested and 23.667 of them have failed
dynamic testing. This work also presented at RSA Conference 2015[35] in San Francisco
by Dormann and Montelibano; presentation subject was "HowWe Discovered Thousands
of Vulnerable Android Apps in One Day". Our work is an update for their reports with
current applications for a Turkish market user and also completes their work with an
application to identify ﬂaws at run time.
Fireeye researchers Adrian Mettler, Yulong Zhang, Vishwanath Raman published an ar-
ticle on 20th August 2014 titled as "SSL Vulnerabilities: Who listens when Android
applications talk?"[36] about SSL Vulnerabilities in Android applications. Researchers
reviewed the 1,000 most-downloaded free applications in the Google Play store as of July
17, 2014 with their commercial product "Mobile Threat Prevention" platform. Article
contains summary of their ﬁndings that 614 applications that use SSL/TLS to commu-
nicate with a remote server, 448 ( ∼73%) of them do not check certiﬁcates. Article also
includes some references for best practices. Our work is an update for their reports with
current applications for a Turkish market user and also completes their work with an
application to identify ﬂaws at run time.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, we plan to analyze applications that are popular at the market against SSL
miss-implementations. This miss-implementations can cause leakage of private informa-
tion like ﬁnancial data, health records or passwords of the users of that application.
Our study began with working on theoretical information like Android operation system
internals, SSL implementations while application development and etc. After theoretical
information it's time to analyses the applications. Second phase began with gathering
applications from application market which is Google Play Store. 8882 applications
gathered from 45 diﬀerent categories. Those applications go through a static analysis
and identiﬁed as safe, potentially risky application. Risky applications analyzed for a
second time for their permission requests. Then a small number of selected application
go through a dynamic analysis.
A risk factor is calculated for each risky application. This risk factor is calculated with
diﬀerent indications like permission requests, number of downloads and category of the
application. All factors calculated and applications graded for their risk points and they
are normalized in to ten risk groups.
At the end of our analysis we investigate our ﬁndings. A risk factor is calculated from
that ﬁndings for each risky application. 2354 application has at least one miss use of
SSL libraries out of 8882.
Our ﬁndings from dynamic analysis was: Applications are less vulnerable compared to
static analysis results. The vulnerable libraries might not be used or they are used by
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a speciﬁc path application. But results conﬁrmed that the impact of vulnerabilities can
be enormous.
As a conclusion, we observed that almost 27 percent has a vulnerability from SSL con-
nection stand point. The main reasons for these vulnerabilities are developer errors and
third party generators or libraries. Using third party libraries can cause security bugs
which leads to informations leakage or exploitation. A developer must have deeply un-
derstanding of what he is developing especially about security concept. Users need to
be cautious and take necessary security precautions while using applications. Always
they need to consider about security. Android application market can enforce some
implementation procedures for SSL extension libraries.
Appendix A
Cross Reference Traversing
import sys,string
from androguard.core.bytecodes.dvm import DalvikVMFormat
from androguard.core.bytecodes.apk import APK
from androguard.core.analysis.analysis import uVMAnalysis
from androguard.core.analysis.ganalysis import GVMAnalysis
def XrefTraverse(methods, class_name, method_name, depth):
depth += 1
for m in methods:
if m.class_name == class_name and m.name == method_name:
if depth == 0:
print (m.class_name + " -> " + m.name)
for item in m.XREFfrom.items:
if item[0].class_name != class_name \\
or item[0].name != method_name:
for x in range(1, depth):
sys.stdout.write('--')
sys.stdout.write ('>' + item[0].class_name + "->" \\
+ item[0].name + "\n")
XrefTraverse(methods, \\
item[0].class_name, item[0].name, depth)
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if len(sys.argv) > 2:
filename = sys.argv[1]
class_name = sys.argv[2]
class_name = 'L' + class_name.replace(".", "/") + ";"
#print class_name
method_name = '<init>'
d = DalvikVMFormat(APK(filename, False).get_dex())
d.create_python_export()
dx = uVMAnalysis(d)
gx = GVMAnalysis(dx, None)
d.set_vmanalysis(dx)
d.set_gvmanalysis(gx)
d.create_xref()
XrefTraverse(d.get_methods(), class_name, method_name, 0)
else:
print "usage: XrefTree.py [filename] [class_name]"
print "usage: XrefTree.py filename.apk com.xyz.abc"
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